Aldridge v. The State., 237 Ga. App. 209, 515 S.E.2d 397 (1999)
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Vansant, Corriere & McClure, John M. Vansant, Jr., Michael W. Strahan, for appellant.
A jury convicted William Nelson Aldridge of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute (OCGA
1. Aldridge contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict on Counts 1 and 2 of the indictment, possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute and possession of less than one ounce of marijuana. The standard of review for a denial of a motion for directed verdict of acquittal when the sufficiency of evidence is challenged is whether, under the rule of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979), the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant guilty of the offenses charged. Cantrell v. State,
On September 23, 1997, at about 1:53 a.m., Mitchell County Sheriff's Deputies Luckey and Hayes observed a car traveling toward them on Highway 300. The car was being operated without headlights. Just as the deputies activated their blue lights and turned the patrol car around to follow, the driver pulled over onto the shoulder of the highway. As the deputies drove up behind the car, they saw the driver reach over the seat as if he were placing something on the floorboard behind the passenger seat.
Although Aldridge was able to produce a valid driver's license, he had no proof of insurance. Aldridge searched through the front of the vehicle, looking for an insurance card while explaining to the deputies that he was driving a car that belonged to a friend, Jody Cox. The deputies had their dispatcher telephone Cox; Cox claimed the car but admitted he had no insurance. While Aldridge was looking through the car trying to find an insurance card, the deputies noticed the car's tag had expired. They also observed signs that Aldridge was intoxicated: his speech was slurred, his eyes were glassy, his gait was unbalanced, and he leaned frequently on the car. The deputies asked Aldridge if he was under the influence of alcohol. Aldridge said "no" and agreed to take an alco-sensor test. The deputies then radioed a senior deputy, Allegoode, who had the alco-sensor device. While awaiting Deputy Allegoode's arrival, the deputies asked Aldridge if he would consent to a search of his car. Aldridge agreed.
While en route, Deputy Allegoode radioed for a wrecker to tow Aldridge's car. When Allegoode arrived, he administered the alco-sensor test, which Aldridge passed with a .00 test result. The deputies did not perform any other field sobriety tests because Aldridge was so unsteady on his feet. Although Aldridge passed the alco-sensor test, the deputies still suspected Aldridge was under the influence of something because he had been driving without headlights and showed signs of intoxication. When asked if he was under the influence of any medication, Aldridge responded "no." When asked if he had any contraband in the car, Aldridge again responded "no" and told the deputies they could search his car. He even agreed to sign a consent to search form. However, the deputies were out of consent forms.
Deputy Luckey searched Aldridge's car. He found a black plastic glasses case on the floorboard behind the passenger's seat. A plastic bag was sticking out from the corner of the case. Inside the bag was less than an ounce of a green leafy material which tested positive for marijuana. The deputies also found in the case a plastic bag containing a large chunk and several individually packaged smaller "rocks" of a white substance which tested positive for methamphetamine. The large chunk and the individually packaged rocks of methamphetamine had a combined weight of 18.8 grams and an estimated street value of $1,800. A drug task force agent testified that the amount of methamphetamine found, its street value, and the way it was packaged evidenced a plan to distribute the drug. The deputies also found a small glass vial and a butane torch in the car. The vial and the torch are often used to smoke methamphetamine. The vial contained methamphetamine residue.
Upon discovering the suspected contraband, deputies Hayes and Luckey placed Aldridge under arrest. Deputy Luckey read Aldridge the implied consent warning and asked him to submit to a urine test. Aldridge refused. When they arrived at the police station, the deputies again read Aldridge his implied consent warning and asked him to consent-to a urine test. Again, Aldridge refused. During the course of the entire incident, Aldridge never offered an explanation for why he was driving without his headlights. The deputies found nothing wrong with the car. Aldridge did tell the officers he was driving to the gas station to get gasoline. However, the station he said he was going to had been closed for several hours.
At trial, Jody Cox testified that the car Aldridge was driving and the glasses case found in it belonged to him. But Cox testified that when Aldridge took the car Cox had no reason to believe there was any contraband in it. The drugs were not his. Further, he had no reason to believe that anyone else who had access to the car would have put drugs in it.
Aldridge argues that mere presence in the vicinity of contraband, without more, does not establish possession and there must be a showing of possession by him other than mere spatial proximity. While we agree with those principles of law, they are inapplicable here. Although Aldridge was driving a borrowed car and the drugs were discovered in a place out of Aldridge's view, the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to show Aldridge had sole, actual possession of the drugs.
First, when the deputies blue-lighted the car, they saw Aldridge reach over the driver's seat as if he were concealing something behind the passenger's seat where the contraband was in fact found. Second, although others may have had access to the car prior to Aldridge's driving it, Jody Cox testified that he had no knowledge of the drugs being in his car or in his glasses case. Further, Cox had no reason to believe that anyone else who may have had access to the car would have put drugs in it. Third, Aldridge appeared intoxicated. His speech was slurred; his eyes, glassy; his gait, impaired. Fourth, although Aldridge agreed to take an alco-sensor test, and passed it, he declined to take a urine test. The jury was authorized to infer from this that a urine test would reveal the presence of methamphetamine or marijuana in Aldridge's system. See Rayburn v. State,
This evidence shows a connection between Aldridge and the contraband that goes beyond mere spatial proximity. In fact, the evidence and all the inferences logically drawn from the evidence supports a conclusion that Aldridge had direct, physical control over the drugs because he had been using them and had concealed them when the deputies pulled him over. Consequently, we believe this evidence, though largely circumstantial, was sufficient to support the jury's finding that Aldridge was in sole, actual possession of the methamphetamine and marijuana found in the car. See, e.g., Noble v. State,
3. Aldridge argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the methamphetamine and marijuana evidence because it was obtained as the result of an illegal, warrantless search of his car. Specifically, Aldridge argues that because he was detained for approximately 45 to 50 minutes before giving his consent to search, he was "in custody" and his consent was, therefore, invalid. We do not agree.
The fact that Aldridge's car was being driven without headlights, creating a traffic hazard, authorized the officers to investigate Aldridge's condition as well as that of the car. See Pupo v. State,
We do not believe that the delays occasioned by the wait for Deputy Allegoode and his alco-sensor device and by the deputies' search for consent forms was unreasonable, evidenced a lack of diligence, or converted the investigation into a custodial situation. "The stop did not exceed the bounds of an investigative detention, so [Aldridge's] consent to search was not the product of an illegal detention. The evidence supports the court's finding that his consent was freely and voluntarily given." Taylor v. State,
6. Aldridge argues the court erred in refusing to allow him both opening and closing final arguments in violation of OCGA
While cross-examining the State's witnesses, Aldridge identified two exhibits and marked them as Defendant's Exhibits 1 and 2. During his cross-examination of Deputy Hayes, Aldridge marked as Defendant's Exhibit 1 Deputy Hayes' supplemental report of Aldridge's arrest. After doing so, he handed the report to Deputy Hayes and had him read into evidence highlighted portions of it. During his cross-examination of Deputy Allegoode, Aldridge marked as Defendant's Exhibit 2 a copy of Deputy Allegoode's arrest report. After doing so, he handed Allegoode the report and had him read highlighted portions of it into evidence. Although neither document was formally admitted into evidence, portions of the contents of both defense exhibits were presented to the jury, that is, they were "introduced" into evidence. Presenting the documents' contents to the jury was "the equivalent of a formal tender of evidence divesting [Aldridge] of the right to open and close final arguments." See Kennebrew v. State,
8. Finally, Aldridge complains that the court's jury instruction defining joint or shared possession was misleading because it may have prompted the jury to believe they could convict Aldridge if they found he and Cox shared possession of the contraband. We do not agree.
In this case, the court twice charged the jury that they could only convict Aldridge if they found he was in sole, actual possession of the contraband. The jury instruction, taken from the Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II: Criminal Cases, p. 136, simply explained what sole possession meant by contrasting it with the definition of joint possession. While under the circumstances of this case it may have been the better practice to adjust the charge by omitting the definition of joint possession, "[w]here a charge as a whole substantially presents issues in such a way as is not likely to confuse the jury even though a portion of the charge may not be as clear and precise as could be desired, a reviewing court will not disturb a verdict amply authorized by the evidence." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Callaway v. State,
ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.
On motion for reconsideration, Aldridge contends that Division 6 of our opinion cannot be reconciled with our recent decisions in Whitehead v. State,
Before a witness may be impeached with a prior inconsistent statement, the statement must be "called to his mind with as much certainty as possible." OCGA
In Davis v. State, 235 Ga. App. at 257, we held that defense counsel's reading a prior inconsistent statement to a witness before questioning him about it was simply "foundational" and did not constitute the introduction of evidence because this procedure comported with that set forth in OCGA
J. Brown Moseley, District Attorney, Victoria Spear-Darrisaw, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
1999
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This document cites
- U.S. Supreme Court - Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)
- Supreme Court of Georgia - DUCKWORTH v. THE STATE., 268 Ga. 566, 492 S.E.2.d 201
- Supreme Court of Georgia - KENNEBREW v. THE STATE., 267 Ga. 400, 480 S.E.2.d 1 (1996)
- Supreme Court of Georgia - GREEN v. THE STATE., 260 Ga. 625, 398 S.E.2.d 360
- Georgia Court Of Appeals - Rayburn v. The State., 234 Ga. App. 482, 506 S.E.2d 876 (1998)
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