Davis v. The State (Two Cases)., 181 Ga. App. 28, 351 S.E.2d 458 (1986)
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Summary
Judgments affirmed. Carley and Pope, JJ., concur.
Summary
Judgments affirmed. Carley and Pope, JJ., concur.
Text
Adele P. Grubbs, for appellant.
Defendant appeals his conviction of two counts of violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act (possession with intent to distribute Phentermine (Count 1) and cocaine (Count 2)). In the companion case defendant appeals from the denial of his motion for supersedeas bond pending appeal. Held:
1. Defendant contends that the State failed to prove venue as to Count 2. Gantt, a former deputy sheriff testified that while working undercover he purchased the cocaine from defendant at his house. The crux of defendant's argument is whether the State proved that defendant's house was located in Paulding County.
When asked whether defendant's house was in Paulding County, the former deputy sheriff responded, "Yes, sir. I believe it's Paulding County area." Defendant argues that testimony that the crime occurred in the Paulding County area is not evidence of venue in Paulding County. However, the former deputy sheriff had previously responded affirmatively to a query as to his having "had an occasion to go by the defendant's house here in Paulding County." Slight evidence is sufficient to establish venue where there is no conflicting evidence. See Ludden v. State,
2. Count 1 of the indictment charged that defendant did "deliver, distribute and possess with intent to distribute," a controlled substance. Count 2 of the indictment charged that defendant did "deliver, distribute, sell and possess with intent to distribute" a controlled substance. Defendant complains that the trial court charged only as to "possession with intent to distribute" and did not charge the jury as to the other means by which the crimes charged could be accomplished. Thus, defendant argues the charges were not tailored to fit the charges in the indictment.
The trial court's duty in delivering charges to the jury is to tailor those charges not only to the indictment but also adjust them to the evidence at trial. See Crosby v. State,
4. In a Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (83 SC 1194, 10 LE2d 215) motion defendant requested that the State disclose all records of funds provided to former deputy sheriff Gantt for purchase of drugs. The trial court denied this portion of defendant's motion and defendant enumerates this decision as error. However, the defendant has failed to show any way in which his defense was materially prejudiced by the trial court's ruling or indeed that any exculpatory material was withheld. Upshaw v. State,
5. Defendant contends that the trial court erred in restricting his cross-examination of former deputy sheriff Gantt as to the ownership of an automobile driven by Gantt. Outside the presence of the jury it was disclosed that Gantt was "presently with the FBI and DEA in a pending investigation" and would prefer not to disclose the ownership or intended use of the automobile. Defendant contends that due to evidence of the deputy sheriff's financial difficulties the ownership of the automobile was relevant to the witness' credibility. We do not agree. Law enforcement officers are commonly paid a salary and furnished with automobiles. Their dependence on such does not open the door to irrelevant inquiries. "An exercise of discretion by the trial court in excluding irrelevant evidence cannot be error and will not be error in the absence of an abuse of discretion. Harris v. State,
6. In his seventh enumeration of error defendant raises the sufficiency of the evidence. The State's evidence shows that defendant gave former deputy sheriff Gantt a capsule of Phentermine and that on a separate occasion the deputy sheriff purchased cocaine from defendant.
Defendant argues that the deputy sheriff has been impeached in a number of ways and that as a matter of law the testimony of the deputy sheriff cannot be believed or considered. However, the question of whether a witness has been impeached and other matters as to credibility are for the jury. We find that any rational trier of fact could reasonably have found from the evidence adduced at trial proof of defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt of the offenses charged. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560); Johnson v. State,
7. The trial court did not err in refusing to give defendant's requested "Charge No. 26 in regard to the law of the crime of bad check." Defendant incorrectly argues that the bad check statute (OCGA
8. Defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to give his requested charges based on OCGA
10. In the companion case defendant enumerates as error the denial of his motion for supersedeas bond pending appeal and the underlying factual findings. There was compliance with the applicable procedure set forth in Birge v. State,
William A. Foster III, District Attorney, Christene Daniel, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
1986
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This document cites
- Supreme Court of Georgia - THE STATE v. BRADDY., 254 Ga. 366, 330 S.E.2.d 338 (1985)
- Supreme Court of Georgia - EVANS v. THE STATE., 245 Ga. 592, 266 S.E.2.d 201 (1980)
- Supreme Court of Georgia - KELLY v. THE STATE., 241 Ga. 190, 243 S.E.2.d 857 (1978)
- Supreme Court of Georgia - BIRGE v. THE STATE., 238 Ga. 88, 230 S.E.2.d 895
- Georgia Court Of Appeals - Ludden v. The State., 176 Ga. App. 109, 335 S.E.2d 428 (1985)
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