Summary
Judgment affirmed. Birdsong, C. J., Deen, P. J., McMurray, P. J., Banke, P. J., Carley, Sognier and Pope, JJ., concur. Benham, J., dissents.
Summary
Judgment affirmed. Birdsong, C. J., Deen, P. J., McMurray, P. J., Banke, P. J., Carley, Sognier and Pope, JJ., concur. Benham, J., dissents.
Text
Favors, observed by a MARTA policeman consuming alcohol in a station, was approached by an officer, who noticed a bulge in Favors' waist band and removed a loaded .38. Favors was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon (OCGA
1. In addition to the inclusion of the previous convictions in the indictment itself, Favors received notice before trial that the state intended to use the two prior weapons convictions as either evidence of similar transactions or in aggravation of punishment.
Both OCGA
Under Georgia's old two-step felony trial procedure where sentence was imposed by the same jury which decided guilt, it was required that in order for any prior convictions to be considered in aggravation of punishment, they had to be included in the indictment. Riggins v. Stynchcombe,
Riggins, supra at 593; Hendrixson, supra at 854.
Favors was indicted as a recidivist, with the prior weapons convictions set out in the indictment. No evidence of these convictions was presented to the jury, but the allegations concerning them were left unobscured on the indictment for their observation during their deliberations at the end of the guilt/innocence phase of the trial.
Defendant had moved at the commencement of trial that they be removed. Assuming it was error not to cover or take out the allegations of prior convictions, see Williams v. State,
Moreover, the earlier weapons convictions had arisen out of the armed robberies, which were the felonies underlying the third count. Since, as discussed below, the jury legitimately was made aware of those convictions and saw from the indictments that they involved the use of a pistol or pistols (in one case the item stolen was also a pistol), leaving the allegations regarding the weapons convictions on the indictment was of little if any consequence. Even where the prior convictions are actually in evidence, which was not the case here, overwhelming evidence of guilt allows affirmance despite error. See Stone v. State,
2. Unlike the recidivist statutes, OCGA
J. Douglas Willix, for appellant.
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This document cites
- Supreme Court of Georgia - EVANS v. THE STATE., 253 Ga. 331, 320 S.E.2.d 168 (1984)
- Supreme Court of Georgia - HEAD v. THE STATE., 253 Ga. 429, 322 S.E.2.d 228 (1984)
- Supreme Court of Georgia - STONE v. THE STATE., 253 Ga. 433, 321 S.E.2.d 723 (1984)
- Supreme Court of Georgia - THE STATE v. HENDRIXSON., 251 Ga. 853, 310 S.E.2.d 526
- Supreme Court of Georgia - PRATHER v. THE STATE., 247 Ga. 789, 279 S.E.2.d 697
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