Guffey v. The State., 191 Ga. App. 501, 382 S.E.2d 202 (1989)
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Judgment affirmed. Deen, P. J., and Benham, J., concur.
Summary
Judgment affirmed. Deen, P. J., and Benham, J., concur.
Text
W. Danis Hentz, for appellant.
Appellant, Michael Eugene Guffey, was convicted of child molestation of his seven-year-old stepdaughter, M. E. He appeals the judgment of conviction and sentence.
1. Appellant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in finding M. E. and J. G., age 5, competent to testify.
In his brief appellant makes numerous assertions, some which are not supported by the record. Unsupported factual assertions contained in the briefs of the parties, but not supported by the record, cannot be considered in the appellate process. Behar v. Aero Med Intl.,
Appellant notes that following the competency examination of J. G., the trial court opined that her competency was "a mighty close question," but concluded that the witness was competent and that "she will tell the truth as she sees it, but I think its a close question." Appellant relies on various precedents of the Georgia appellate courts, including Strickland v. State,
On appellate review, we cannot merely substitute our judgment for that of the trial court in resolving questions of competency, for our views of this matter are perforce based upon reading the trial record without benefit of having observed the courtroom demeanor of the witnesses. The determination of competency of a child witness rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, and we will not reverse in the absence of manifest abuse of discretion. Thurmond v. State, 220 Ga. 277 (3) (138 SE2d 372); Reece v. State,
Balancing the probative value of the evidence of appellant's sexual abuse of the victim's younger sister against its potentially prejudicial impact, Oller, supra at 820-821, we find that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by admitting J. G.'s testimony.
3. Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to direct a verdict of acquittal for the reason that the evidence was insufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to return a verdict of guilty.
"[A] motion for directed verdict in a criminal trial should only be granted where there is no conflict in the evidence and the evidence demands a verdict of acquittal as a matter of law." Taylor v. State, 252 Ga. 125 (1) (312 SE2d 311).
On appeal the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Watts v. State, 186 Ga. App. 358 (1) (366 SE2d 849). The posture of the evidence when so viewed is not such as to demand a verdict of acquittal. Review of the transcript in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict "reveals ample evidence from which any rational trier of fact could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of [the offense] charged." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560); Baggett v. State, 257 Ga. 735 (2) (363 SE2d 257).
Ralph L. Van Pelt, District Attorney, John L. O'Dell, Susan R. Sarratt, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.
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This document cites
- Supreme Court of Georgia - BAGGETT v. THE STATE., 257 Ga. 735, 363 S.E.2.d 257 (1988)
- Supreme Court of Georgia - TAYLOR v. THE STATE., 252 Ga. 125, 312 S.E.2.d 311 (1984)
- Supreme Court of Georgia - THURMOND v. THE STATE., 220 Ga. 277, 138 S.E.2.d 372 (1964)
- Georgia Court Of Appeals - Watts v. The State., 186 Ga. App. 358, 366 S.E.2d 849 (1988)
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