Jones v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation., 151 Ga. App. 619, 260 S.E.2d 751 (1979)

Georgia Court Of Appeals

Status: ARGUED

Docket Number: 57901

Parts: SMITH, Judge.

Linked as:

Summary

Judgment reversed. Quillian, P. J., and Birdsong, J., concur.

Summary

Judgment reversed. Quillian, P. J., and Birdsong, J., concur.

Text

Taylor W. Jones, Steven W. Ludwick, for appellant.

Appellee FDIC, receiver of the Hamilton Bank and Trust Company, was granted summary judgment in its suit on a promissory note. Appellant asserts that material issues of fact remain with respect to the defenses of accord and satisfaction and set-off. We reverse.

1. It was incumbent on appellee to pierce appellant's defense of accord and satisfaction. Meade v. Heimanson, 239 Ga. 177 (236 SE2d 357) (1977). While the burden at trial is upon appellant to establish the existence of an accord and satisfaction, the burden was on appellee, as the party who made the motion for summary judgment, to establish that no material issues of fact remained for trial. Appellee failed to carry this burden because it made no showing of the non-existence of an accord and satisfaction. Since appellee did not pierce appellant's defense of accord and satisfaction, the alleged inadequacy of the affidavits offered by appellant in opposition to the motion for summary judgment is of no consequence.

2. Contrary to appellee's assertion, 12 USC 1823 (e) does not require that the accord and satisfaction alleged in this case be in writing. Section 1823 (e) "allows the FDIC, when it has purchased assets in its corporate capacity, to disregard oral agreements which would diminish or defeat its interest in any asset so purchased . . ." FDIC v. Vogel, 437 FSupp 660, 663 (E.D.W. 1977). The promissory note here was not purchased by FDIC in its corporate capacity, but was acquired by FDIC in its capacity as receiver of Hamilton Bank. Therefore, 1823 (e) is inapplicable.

4. Appellee asserts that appellant's set-off defense was barred under Code 20-1305, which states: "When a negotiable paper is sued on by a holder or indorsee, received under dishonor, no setoff is allowed against the original payee, except such as is in some way connected with the debt sued on, or the transaction out of which it sprung." We cannot agree with appellee's position that Code 20-1305 bars appellant from asserting a set-off defense in the instant case. The procedural benefit afforded by Code 20-1305 is not available to a party who is the original payee of negotiable paper. Cole v. Bank of Bowersville, 109 Ga. App. 225, 227 (136 SE2d 18) (1964)), and cannot take advantage of the procedural benefit afforded by Code 20-1305.

5. The remaining enumerations of error have either been abandoned or are without merit.

Richard T. Elliott, Michael Dailey, for appellee.

1979