Billy L. Spruell, for appellant.
Appellant Henry Xavier Kennedy appeals his jury conviction for the offense of first degree arson in the September 23, 1981 fire which destroyed his log cabin. He assigns error to the charge and argues that the evidence was not sufficient to support the verdict.
1. Appellant's first three enumerations of error involve certain instructions given or not given by the trial court to the jury. Upon completion of the charge, the trial court inquired if there were any exceptions to the charge. Counsel for appellant replied: "I don't believe I have any exceptions at this time." In Jackson v. State,
2. Appellant first challenges the trial court's charge on the defense of alibi. The court charged in part: "The defendant in this case contends that he was not present at the scene of the offense at the time of its commission. In that connection, I charge you that alibi as a defense involves the possibility of the accused's presence at the scene of the crime or the offense at the time of its commission. I further charge you that the presence of the defendant at the scene of the crime as alleged in this particular indictment or his involvement as a co-conspirator or party is an essential element of the crime set forth in this indictment, and the burden of proof upon such issue is upon the State . . . . Any evidence in the nature of an alibi should be considered by the jury in connection with all other facts in the case, and if upon considering the evidence as a whole you, the jury, should entertain a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, you should acquit him of the offense as charged."
(a) Appellant contends that the charge inaccurately ascribed to him the contention that an offense or crime had, in fact, occurred, thereby effectively destroying his defense of accidental burning and also destroying his defense of alibi. As appellant concedes, the instruction given by the trial court is essentially the same as the charge approved in Patterson v. State,
The language complained of is not incorrect as a matter of law (see OCGA
(b) Appellant also assigns error to the trial court's use of the word "possibility" instead of "impossibility" in instructing the jury on alibi. OCGA
(c) Appellant lastly alleges error in the part of the charge which allegedly injects the theory of conspiracy into the case. Also, his second enumeration of error objects to the trial court instructing the jury as to parties to a crime. Appellant alleges that there was no evidence to authorize either instruction, and that the giving of these instructions effectively destroyed his alibi defense. A review of the transcript reveals that appellant went to great lengths to establish an alibi. Yet, expert testimony strongly suggested that the fire was incendiary in origin. If the fire was incendiary in origin, someone had to start it. Although at trial appellant contended primarily that the cause of the fire was accidental, he conceded that someone could have broken into the building and set the fire. On the night of the fire, appellant removed a stove from the log cabin and possibly his clothing, since the dresser drawers where appellant kept some of his clothing were empty. From this the jury could have inferred prior knowledge by the appellant and concluded that he had arranged with someone else to set the fire and then absented himself so as to appear innocent. Thus, there was some evidence of conspiracy and that appellant was a party to the arson. "It is well established that an instruction is not inapplicable where there is any evidence, however slight, on which to predicate it. [Cit.] To justify a charge on a given subject, it is not necessary there should be compelling evidence giving rise to that point; it is enough if there be something from which a legitimate process of reasoning can be drawn from it by the jury." Williams v. State,
3. Appellant next urges this court to set aside his conviction based upon alleged error in failing to properly instruct the jury as to the defense of accident. The court charged the jury: "There may be some suggestion of accident in this case or contention of accident. At any rate, the Court will charge you that a person shall not be found guilty of any crime whereby it satisfactorily appears that there was no criminal scheme or undertaking or intention." Appellant alleges that the foregoing charge conflicts with the presumption of accidental burning, disparages the defense of accident, and is burden-shifting.
(a) The trial court instructed the jury that "in connection with arson that the law presumes that every fire to be an accident or providential cause until the State shall establish beyond a reasonable doubt that such fire was the result of criminal agency, that is, a willful and intentional burn." This is a generally correct statement of the law (see Phillips v. State,
(c) In our view, the charge complained of is not impermissibly burden-shifting. See Chandle v. State,
4. Appellant finally challenges the denial of his motion for new trial on the ground that the verdict was based upon an asserted insufficiency of evidence to prove that he committed the crime charged. "The accused, having been convicted by a jury and his conviction having been approved by the trial court in overruling the motion for a new trial, it is incumbent upon a court of review to construe the evidence in a light most unfavorable to the accused. This is true, for every presumption is in favor of such a verdict." Lockhart v. State,
Lewis R. Slaton, District Attorney, Joseph J. Drolet, Benjamin II. Oehlert III, Harvey W. Moskowitz, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.
This document cites
- Supreme Court of Georgia - JACKSON et al. v. THE STATE., 246 Ga. 459, 271 S.E.2.d 855
- Supreme Court of Georgia - WHITE v. THE STATE., 243 Ga. 250, 253 S.E.2.d 694
- Supreme Court of Georgia - THE STATE v. MOORE., 237 Ga. 269, 227 S.E.2.d 241 (1976)
- Supreme Court of Georgia - LOFTON v. THE STATE., 237 Ga. 275, 227 S.E.2.d 327
- Supreme Court of Georgia - GAITHER v. THE STATE., 234 Ga. 465, 216 S.E.2.d 324 (1975)
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