Medlin Et Al. v. Royston Lumber &Amp; Building Supply, Inc. Et Al., 193 Ga. App. 608, 388 S.E.2d 861 (1989)
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Judgment affirmed. Deen, P. J., and Birdsong, J., concur.
Summary
Judgment affirmed. Deen, P. J., and Birdsong, J., concur.
Text
Webb, Carlock, Copeland, Semler & Stair, Kent T. Stair, Douglas A. Wilde, Rodger E. Davison, Blasingame, Burch, Garrard & Bryant, Rodger E. Davison, for appellees.Stephen C. Carter, William O. Carter, for appellants.
Appellants, husband and wife, sued appellees, employer and employee, for injuries Mr. Medlin suffered in a collision between a car in which he was a passenger and a truck driven by appellee Harbert in the course of his employment with Royston Lumber, and for Mrs. Medlin's loss of consortium resulting from Mr. Medlin's injuries. Having sought damages of $141,760.14 for Mr. Medlin and $35,000 for Mrs. Medlin, appellants bring this appeal from a judgment entered on a verdict awarding him $15,000.78, and awarding her $1,000.
1. Appellants' first enumeration of error is that the trial court erred in denying their motion for new trial on the ground that the verdict was infected by improper contact between two jurors and the owner of the corporate defendant, Hart. Evidence adduced by appellants in support of that ground of their motion showed that they saw the jurors speaking to Hart and reported the contact to a bailiff; that the bailiff reported the contact to the trial judge, who directed the bailiff to instruct appellants to take the matter up with their attorney; that the bailiff did so; and that appellants did not tell their attorney until after judgment had been entered in the case. Evidence taken in opposition to that ground of the motion showed that Hart stepped out of the courthouse for fresh air while the charge conference was being conducted in chambers; that two jurors walked up to the courthouse and one of them greeted him; that he and the juror briefly discussed masonry work in progress across the street; and that no conversation related to the trial took place at all. There was no evidence contradictory of that submitted in opposition to the motion. Assuming that the issue was properly before the trial court (but see Rogers v. Martin,
2. In their second enumeration of error, appellants complain of the denial of their motion for new trial on the ground that the trial court erroneously excluded from evidence redirect examination testimony of a physician whose videotaped deposition was introduced by agreement of the parties. Their complaint on this issue has two parts, one procedural and the other evidentiary.
Appellants first argue that appellees had no standing to object at trial to the admission of the redirect examination testimony because it had been stipulated at the taking of the deposition that all objections would be made at the taking of the deposition. The record does not support that assertion. The transcript of the deposition reveals that the parties showed some confusion concerning when and how objections would be made, but concluded their discussion of the matter with an agreement that the Civil Practice Act would control. As the trial court pointed out in its order denying the motion for new trial, OCGA
Further, it would not have rebutted the prior testimony [on cross-examination]. The trial judge acted within his sound discretion in refusing to allow the objected-to testimony." Hortman v. Gresham,
3. The third and fourth enumerations of error are directed to the size of the jury's award to appellants. Appellants contend the awards are so grossly inadequate as to shock the conscience. "[T]he standard for the award of general damages for pain and suffering is the enlightened consciences of fair and impartial jurors. [Cits.] The general rule on appeal of an award of damages is that a jury's award cannot be successfully attacked so as to warrant a new trial unless it is so flagrantly excessive or inadequate, in the light of the evidence, as to create a clear implication of bias, prejudice, or gross mistake on the part of the jurors. [Cits.] Even though the evidence is such as to authorize a greater or lesser award than that actually made, the appellate court will not disturb it unless it is so flagrant as to 'shock the conscience.' [Cits.]" Cullen v. Timm,
4. Appellants' final enumeration of error is no more than a summary of the first four and presents no independent basis for reversal. Having found no reason in the first four enumerations of error, we find none in the fifth.
1989
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