Travelers Insurance Company Et Al. v. Linn., 235 Ga. App. 641, 510 S.E.2d 139 (1998)
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Summary
Judgment affirmed. Pope, P. J., concurs. Beasley, J., concurs in the judgment only.
Summary
Judgment affirmed. Pope, P. J., concurs. Beasley, J., concurs in the judgment only.
Text
Travelers Insurance Company (Travelers) and Windsor at River Heights Limited Partnership (Windsor) sued Adrienne Linn and others for damages sustained when Linn's apartment was damaged in a fire. The trial court granted Linn's motion for summary judgment, and plaintiffs appeal. For reasons discussed below, we affirm.
"Summary judgment is appropriate when the court, viewing all evidence and drawing all inferences in a light most favorable for the nonmovant, concludes that the evidence does not create a triable issue as to each essential element of the case. Lau's Corp. v. Haskins,
The record shows that Linn leased an apartment at a complex owned by Windsor. Mary and Irving Walker also lived at the apartment with their three children. Although Linn was the sole lessee, Mary and Irving Walker were identified in the lease as "occupants other than lessee." Sometime before midnight on December 23, 1995, the Walkers' 15-year-old child, Lee Walker, started a fire in Linn's fireplace. At the time, Linn and Mary Walker were in the kitchen. One of the other children told Mary Walker that Lee had started a fire, and Mary told Lee to extinguish the fire. Mary called to her husband, who was in the shower, and he also told Lee to extinguish the fire.
Lee extinguished the fire with a bottle of water, cleaned the fireplace, and put the ashes into a cardboard box, which he set on the wooden deck outside the apartment. He also placed the burned logs outside with the remainder of the firewood. Neither Mary Walker nor Linn saw the child place the logs or ashes outside. Later that night, Linn and the Walkers awoke to find the apartment on fire. The fire completely destroyed Linn's apartment and caused severe damage to the remainder of the building. The fire department investigator later determined that the fireplace debris placed on the deck was the likely source of the fire.
After the fire, Linn and the Walkers moved into a new apartment in the complex. On December 27, 1995, Linn signed a new lease for this second apartment, and her security deposit was transferred to the new apartment. On April 11, 1996, when this second lease expired, Windsor returned Linn's security deposit, less certain amounts for damage to the second apartment as well as for some outstanding rent.
On March 15, 1996, Travelers' attorney sent Linn a letter stating that she was liable for over $800,000 in damage to the original apartment building as a result of the fire. On December 19, 1996, Travelers filed suit against Linn and the Walkers for damage to the original apartment building. Windsor was subsequently added as an additional plaintiff. On November 25, 1997, the trial court granted Linn's motion for summary judgment, leaving the claims against the Walkers outstanding. The trial court's order did not indicate the basis for granting summary judgment.
1. Security Deposit Statute. Linn contends that plaintiffs are precluded from asserting any claims relating to the fire damage because Windsor failed to comply with its obligations under the security deposit statute, OCGA
OCGA
It is undisputed that plaintiffs did not provide Linn with a list of damages to the first apartment within three days of the termination of the lease on such apartment. The first written notice to Linn regarding the fire damage was the March 15, 1996 letter from plaintiffs' counsel notifying her that she was responsible for over $800,000 in damages. Linn argues that because plaintiffs did not give her the written statements required by OCGA
However, because plaintiffs did not retain Linn's security deposit to cover the damages caused by the fire, they were never obligated to provide her with any of the written statements listed in the statutes. OCGA
"[T]he intent of [the security deposit] legislation is only to prevent the wrongful withholding of security deposits from tenants by landlords." Kimber v. Towne Hills Dev. Co.,
Moreover, "forfeitures and penalties are not favored and statutes relating to them must be strictly construed, and in a manner as favorable to the person against whom the forfeiture or penalty would be exacted as is consistent with fair principles of interpretation." Moore v. Beneficial Finance Co.,
Moreover, there is no evidence that Linn was negligent in supervising Lee's disposal of the ashes. As mentioned above, Lee's parents were present in the apartment when Lee started the fire, and it was pursuant to their instructions that he extinguished it. There is nothing in the record to show that Linn could not reasonably rely on the Walkers to supervise their own 15-year-old child in such a situation. Indeed, the apartment's own rules and regulations, incorporated into the lease, state that "[a]ll parents shall be held responsible for their own children's actions and see that they, too, abide by the Community Rules and Regulations." Nothing in the record indicates that Linn should have foreseen that Lee would not merely extinguish the fire, but would place the ashes on the deck. Accordingly, there is no evidence that Linn acted unreasonably, and the trial court properly granted summary judgment to Linn on plaintiffs' negligence claims.
3. Breach of contract. Plaintiffs contend that "[t]he trial court erred in finding no triable issues regarding Linn's breach of contract." In their brief, plaintiffs clarify and limit the scope of this enumeration to the following two issues: (1) whether Linn was liable under the contract for Lee Walker's actions and (2) whether Linn breached the contract by allowing combustible material on the premises. See Mauldin v. Weinstock,
In this case, as in Williams and Townsend, the apartment was destroyed by fire, and the fire was not the result of Linn's negligence. Accordingly, this provision of the lease does not provide a basis to hold Linn liable for damage to the apartment.
Plaintiffs also rely on paragraph 12 of the lease, which states that "[i]n the event Lessee fails to pay on or before the due date thereof any payment owing to Lessor under the terms of this lease, whether the same constitutes rent, late charge, payment for damage to property, reimbursement or indemnity for claim of damage to property, or otherwise, . . . [t]hen, in such event, Lessor may obtain possession of the apartment by summary proceedings or by any other lawful means and/or may sue for damages for breach of lease." However, this paragraph merely sets forth the lessor's remedies in the event the lessee fails to make any payment "owing to Lessor under the terms of this lease," and does not constitute an independent basis for the lessee's liability.
Finally, plaintiffs note that paragraph 8 (a) of the lease provides that Linn shall "repair . . . any and all broken glass or other damage in and to the apartment caused by Lessee, his guests, invitees or licensees." Plaintiffs contend that Lee Walker was an invitee or licensee of Linn, and that Linn is therefore liable for any damages caused by Walker.
The terms "licensee" and "invitee" are not defined in the lease. These terms are generally used in premises liability cases, in analyzing the duty owed by a property owner to one who comes onto his premises. See OCGA
In this case, Lee Walker lived at the apartment along with his parents. The lease identified the parents as "occupants other than lessee." Delaine Pierce, Windsor's representative, testified that an "occupant" is someone other than the lessee who permanently resides in the apartment, and that such a person is different from a visitor. Although Lee Walker was not listed as an occupant, Pierce testified that failure to list children as such did not constitute a breach of the lease.
As an occupant of the apartment, Lee Walker does not fit squarely into the category of either licensee or invitee. These terms are generally understood to refer to individuals who come onto the property of another for business or social reasons, and not to be permanent residents. The language of paragraph 8 (a) supports this interpretation, with its reference to "guests, invitees or licensees," but not to "occupants," a term which is used earlier in the lease. If the lessor had intended to make Linn responsible for the negligent acts of other occupants of the apartment, it could have easily included the term occupant" in paragraph 8 (a). Construing the lease against the drafter, we cannot say that Lee Walker fell within the lease's definition of a licensee or invitee. See Marjon Assoc. v. Leasing Intl.,
This contention is without merit. As an initial matter, it does not appear that the term "combustible matter," as used in the lease provision, was intended to include a substance such as fireplace debris. Although incompletely extinguished ashes may indeed reignite, plaintiffs do not contend that the lease prohibits a tenant from starting a fire in her fireplace (which is included with the apartment). Thus, it is clear that ashes from an extinguished fire do not constitute prohibited "combustible matter," at least so long as they remain in the fireplace. Nothing in the lease provision indicates that whether an item is considered combustible depends on its location within the premises. Construing the lease provision against the drafter, and in favor of Linn, it therefore does not appear that the fireplace debris constitutes prohibited combustible matter as contemplated by the lease. See Marjon Assoc., supra.
Moreover, even assuming that the fireplace debris did in fact constitute combustible matter after it was placed on the deck, the record shows that the debris was placed there by Lee Walker, not by Linn. There is no evidence that Linn was even aware Walker had placed the debris on her deck. As discussed above, the lease does not render Linn responsible for all of the actions of other occupants. Thus, there is no evidence that Linn brought or kept combustible matter on the premises in violation of the lease provision.
For the above reasons, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to Linn on plaintiffs' breach of contract claim.
4. Plaintiffs also contend that the trial court erred in finding that they waived compliance with certain lease provisions and in finding a waiver of subrogation in favor of Linn. The trial court made no such findings in its summary judgment order. Because the grant of summary judgment was proper for reasons discussed above, it is not necessary to consider whether such findings would have been proper.
Cozen & O'Connor, David M. Bessho, for appellants.
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