Whitworth v. Connecticut Indemnity Company., 185 Ga. App. 682, 365 S.E.2d 523 (1988)
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Summary
Judgment affirmed. Birdsong, C. J., and Deen, P. J., concur.
Summary
Judgment affirmed. Birdsong, C. J., and Deen, P. J., concur.
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James T. Irvin, for appellant.
Plaintiff was employed by Maypole Chevrolet, Inc., defendant's insured, as a clerical worker. On February 1, 1985, at the request of her employer, plaintiff and another employee traveled to Newnan, Georgia in order to return a Pontiac Fiero automobile to the Maypole dealership in Toccoa. Upon return to the dealership, Maypole terminated plaintiff's employment, citing poor performance as the reason.
Plaintiff subsequently instituted the present action seeking the payment of personal injury protection (PIP) benefits from defendant which plaintiff maintained were owed as the result of the aggravation of a pre-existing back injury that allegedly occurred while plaintiff was driving the Fiero back to Toccoa. Defendant denied coverage, contending that plaintiff's injury did not arise out of the operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as provided by OCGA
1. Plaintiff first enumerates as error the trial court's refusal to charge the jury that "policies of insurance are to be interpreted in favor of coverage and where a policy will bear two interpretations, that sustaining the claim for indemnity will be adopted." We find such a charge was not authorized. In the present case, the coverage available under the policy was stipulated prior to trial, and neither the plaintiff nor the defendant sought to introduce into evidence the policy under which those benefits were provided. Moreover, the issue presented here, to wit: whether the term "accidental bodily injury" as defined in OCGA
2. Plaintiff also contends that the trial court erred in charging defendant's request No. 26 and argues that said request was untimely because it was submitted on the second day, rather than at "the commencement of trial" as provided in Uniform Superior Court Rule 10.3. Again, we find no error. Rule 10.3 expressly provides "that additional requests may be submitted to cover unanticipated points which arise thereafter." The record shows that defendant submitted the charge in question following its receipt and review of plaintiff's requests to charge and that defendant specifically argued that the supplemental charge was in response to one of plaintiff's requested charges. To the extent that the opposing party's requests to charge can never be fully anticipated, we agree that the trial court was authorized to exercise its discretion under the authority provided in Rule 10.3. Cf. General Warranty Corp. &c. v. Cameron-Hogan, Inc.,
Lastly, we also find plaintiff's argument that said charge was factually inapposite to be without merit; hence, this enumeration also affords no basis for reversal.
William S. Sutton, for appellee.
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