Summary
Judgment affirmed with direction. Gardner, P. J., Carlisle and Frankum, JJ., concur.
Summary
Judgment affirmed with direction. Gardner, P. J., Carlisle and Frankum, JJ., concur.
Text
Marson G. Dunaway, Jr., for plaintiffs in error.
The terms of the Superior Court of Polk County are by statute set to commence on the fourth Mondays of February and August. Accordingly, the February term of court commenced on February 23, 1959. On February 26, 1959, the court entered an order in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff. A motion to set aside this order was tendered to the trial judge on August 17, 1959, but was not signed by the judge or filed in the court until August 26, the August term having commenced on August 24, 1959. A rule nisi was set for hearing on October 1, 1959, and on February 4, 1960, the motion was denied, and this judgment is assigned as error.
1. "It is a general principle of law that a court can not set aside or alter its final judgment after the expiration of the term at which it was entered; but this does not apply where proceedings to vacate the judgment were begun during the term in which the judgment was rendered." Maxwell v. Cofer,
3. (a) In the present case the judgment of the trial court overruling the general demurrer to the petition was appealed prior to the trial of the case and that judgment reversed by this court. Delta Ins. Co. v. Wood,
(b) The first sentence of the above quoted order merely makes the judgment of the appellate court the judgment of the trial court, that is it adjudicates that the petition in the form in which it appeared before the appellate court did not state a cause of action. The order does not in itself dismiss the case nor was any subsequent order passed dismissing the case or striking it from the docket, such as appeared in Cauble v. Weimer,
(c) The costs of appeal are taxed in the appellate court as a part of the remittitur (Code 6-1705) and judgment entered against the defendant in error, in case of reversal, as soon as the remittitur is returned to the trial court. Code 6-1704. Accordingly, that portion of the order dealing with the costs of appeal was also proper. But costs in the trial court may not be taxed until final disposition of the case. Code 24-3410. A judgment assessing costs of court against one of the parties is a final judgment which the trial court is without authority to enter on an interlocutory matter. Kight v. Gilliard,
4. Applying the foregoing principles of law to the facts of this case, it appears (a) that the trial court properly made the remittitur of the Court of Appeals its judgment in this case; (b) that in view of the pendency of the amendment previously filed by the plaintiff, such judgment did not have the effect of dismissing the action, which would have been beyond the legal authority of the trial court without consideration of the petition as thus amended, and (c) that that part of the order assessing the costs in the trial court, while erroneous, does not render the order void because of an unamendable defect.
The trial court presently has pending before it a petition, which this court has adjudicated does not set out a cause of action, plus an amendment attempting to remedy the deficiencies thereof. This record does not reveal whether the sufficiency of the amended petition has been challenged by demurrer or motion. That issue has not been passed on by the trial court in so far as this record discloses and is not before this court for decision. The trial court should, on the return of the remittitur in this case, consider any issue properly before it in connection with the entire record and thus let the case proceed to final conclusion in accordance with law.
Dunaway, Embry, & Shelfer, William S. Shelfer, contra.
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